According to the Department of Defense’s own assessment data, the NIST SP 800-171 requirements contractors most often fail are:
- 3.13.11: FIPS-validated cryptography
- 3.5.3: multifactor authentication
- 3.14.1: identifying, reporting, and correcting system flaws on defined timelines
The failures are usually partial, not total. CMMC scores each requirement at the assessment-objective level, and missing a single objective fails the whole requirement.
Where this data comes from
DCMA’s Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center (DIBCAC) has assessed defense contractors against NIST SP 800-171 for years. DIBCAC publicly shared its top 10 “Other Than Satisfied” requirements, drawn from 117 of its High Assessments conducted from 2019 to 2022 (DIBCAC briefing).
Those were government assessments under the DoD Assessment Methodology, not CMMC certification assessments. CMMC Level 2 assesses the same 110 requirements against the same objectives, so the patterns carry over directly.
| Rank | Requirement | Share of assessments with the requirement not satisfied |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3.13.11 FIPS-validated cryptography | 49.6% |
| 2 | 3.5.3 Multifactor authentication | 38.5% |
| 3 | 3.14.1 Identify, report, and correct system flaws | 22.2% |
| 4 | 3.11.1 Periodically assess risk | 17.9% |
| 5 | 3.11.2 Scan for vulnerabilities | 17.9% |
| 6 | 3.3.3 Review and update logged events | 16.2% |
| 7 | 3.3.4 Alert on audit logging failures | 15.4% |
| 8 | 3.3.5 Correlate audit review, analysis, and reporting | 15.4% |
| 9 | 3.6.3 Test incident response capability | 15.4% |
| 10 | 3.4.1 Baseline configurations and inventories | 14.5% |
Source: DCMA DIBCAC, 117 High Assessments, 2019–2022.
Why requirements fail: one objective is enough
NIST SP 800-171A breaks the 110 requirements into 320 assessment objectives. Under the CMMC Assessment Guide, each objective must be MET or NOT APPLICABLE for the requirement to be MET. One NOT MET objective fails the entire requirement.
Most failures follow the same pattern: the organization implements the visible control (“we have MFA”) and misses an objective underneath it (“MFA covers local access to privileged accounts”). See CMMC requirements and scoring.
The most commonly failed requirements
1. 3.13.11: FIPS-validated cryptography
The requirement: use FIPS-validated cryptography when encryption protects the confidentiality of CUI.
Why it fails: products with strong algorithms, or that are “FIPS-capable,” don’t qualify unless the specific cryptographic module has a current validation; the module must also run in its validated (FIPS) mode; encryption gets overlooked on mobile devices, removable media, backups, and file transfers.
The fix: inventory every place encryption protects CUI; confirm each module’s certificate in NIST’s Cryptographic Module Validation Program; verify FIPS mode is enabled. See common CMMC mistakes.
2. 3.5.3: Multifactor authentication
The requirement: use MFA for local and network access to privileged accounts, and for network access to non-privileged accounts.
Why it fails: the assessment has four objectives: [a] privileged accounts identified; [b] MFA for local access to privileged accounts; [c] MFA for network access to privileged accounts; [d] MFA for network access to non-privileged accounts. Common gaps: MFA on email but not VPN or remote access; no MFA on local administrator logons; no documented list of privileged accounts.
The fix: list every privileged account first, then confirm MFA for each access path. This requirement can’t be placed on a POA&M, so it must be fully met at assessment.
3. 3.14.1: Identify, report, and correct system flaws
The requirement: identify, report, and correct system flaws in a timely manner.
Why it fails: the 800-171A objectives require you to define time frames for identifying, reporting, and correcting flaws, then show evidence you met them. “We patch regularly” doesn’t satisfy objectives asking for defined deadlines and proof.
The fix: document flaw-remediation time frames (usually by severity); track identification, reporting, and correction against them; keep the records.
4. 3.11.1: Periodically assess risk
The requirement: periodically assess the risk to operations, assets, and individuals from operating systems that process, store, or transmit CUI.
Why it fails: it gets mistaken for a vulnerability scan or a security assessment; neither is a risk assessment. Many organizations can’t produce a formal, dated risk assessment or a defined frequency for repeating it.
The fix: run and document a risk assessment at a defined frequency, and connect it to your SSP and POA&M decisions.
5. 3.11.2: Scan for vulnerabilities
The requirement: scan for vulnerabilities in systems and applications periodically and when new vulnerabilities affecting them are identified.
Why it fails: the objectives cover systems and applications separately, each needing a defined scan frequency, scans at that frequency, and scans when new vulnerabilities are announced. Common gaps: no documented frequency; infrastructure scanned but applications not; no evidence of event-driven scans after a major vulnerability disclosure.
The fix: define scan frequencies for systems and applications, keep dated scan reports, and record ad hoc scans triggered by new vulnerabilities. Feed the results into your 3.14.1 flaw-remediation process.
6. 3.3.3: Review and update logged events
The requirement: review and update the events your systems log.
Why it fails: organizations turn on logging but never document which events they log, or show they periodically review and update that list. The objectives ask for the review, not just the logs.
The fix: define the logged event types, set a review frequency, and keep a dated record of each review and any changes.
7. 3.3.4: Alert on audit logging process failures
The requirement: alert in the event of an audit logging process failure.
Why it fails: logging is in place, but nothing notifies anyone when it stops. The objectives require the organization to identify who gets alerted and which failures trigger an alert. Logs that silently stop, fill their storage, or lose a source are common findings.
The fix: define the failure types (source stops reporting, storage capacity reached, service down) and the people or roles to alert, configure the alerts, and test them.
8. 3.3.5: Correlate audit review, analysis, and reporting
The requirement: correlate audit record review, analysis, and reporting processes to investigate and respond to unlawful, unauthorized, suspicious, or unusual activity.
Why it fails: logs sit in separate systems (firewall, endpoint, identity, cloud) and are reviewed one at a time, if at all. Without a defined process that brings them together, the correlation objective isn’t met.
The fix: centralize logs in a SIEM or equivalent, document the review and correlation process, and keep records of investigations it produced. If an MSSP runs it, get their evidence and a responsibility matrix.
9. 3.6.3: Test incident response capability
The requirement: test the organizational incident response capability.
Why it fails: an incident response plan exists but has never been exercised, or the test happened without a dated record of who took part, what was tested, and what changed afterward.
The fix: run a tabletop or functional exercise at a defined frequency, at least annually, include the 72-hour DIBNet reporting step, and keep the after-action report.
10. 3.4.1: Baseline configurations and inventories
The requirement: establish and maintain baseline configurations and inventories of organizational systems, including hardware, software, firmware, and documentation, throughout their life cycles.
Why it fails: the objectives require both a baseline and an inventory, each established and maintained. Common gaps: an asset list that is out of date or missing firmware; no documented configuration baselines; baselines written once and never updated.
The fix: maintain a current asset inventory with hardware, software, and firmware versions, document a baseline for each system type, and record reviews and changes. Tie it to your scoping asset inventory.
Failure patterns behind the findings
- Documentation that doesn’t match reality. The SSP describes controls that aren’t implemented, or isn’t specific enough to test. Assessors judge the environment against the SSP. A missing SSP can’t be placed on a POA&M and stops the assessment.
- Missing evidence of periodic activity. Reviews, risk assessments, and training happen, but without dated records proving they happened at the defined frequency.
- Undefined parameters. Requirements that say “periodically” or “in a timely manner” need the organization to define the frequency or time frame. Leaving it undefined fails an objective.
- Service-provider gaps. Controls run by an MSP, MSSP, or cloud provider, with no evidence or responsibility matrix.
- Assessing to the requirement, not the objectives. Self-assessments scored at the 110-requirement level, not the 320-objective level, overstate readiness and SPRS scores.
How strict are CMMC assessors about documentation?
Strict enough that documentation alone can fail a requirement. Assessors use three methods: examine (documents and records), interview (the people who run the control), and test (watching the control work). For many objectives, a policy isn’t enough; you need to show it’s implemented and operates the way the SSP says. Documentation should name systems, frequencies, owners, and tools so an assessor can test it.
Use this list in your self-assessment
- Start your self-assessment with the requirements above, scored at the objective level.
- Collect dated evidence for every “periodic” or “timely” requirement.
- Confirm FIPS module certificates and MFA coverage before anything else; both are high-weight and restricted on POA&Ms.
- Then work through the remaining requirements using the CMMC Assessment Guide.
Frequently asked questions
Work with RSI Security
RSI Security is a Cyber AB-authorized C3PAO that performs independent CMMC Level 2 assessments, scored objective by objective. Organizations that want a gap assessment against these failure patterns can work with RSI Security through a separate advisory engagement. RSI Security does not assess any organization it has advised on CMMC.
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